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ABSTRACT 
Factor mobility and tax evasión are two phenomena that constraint the effectiveness 
of redistributive policies now used by the member countries of the European Union. 
In this paper, a normative analysis of this fact is undertaken using a simple model 
with two countries and two social classes, where capital is perfectly mobile and 
labour is immobile. Each country complements the income of its workers, assumed to 
be poor, with transfers. The latter are financed with two taxes on capital income. The 
first one, following the origin principie, alters the retum and intemational allocation 
of capital. The second one, following the residence principie, induces the evasión of 
capitalists' incomes. Each government chooses the optimal mix of capital taxes that 
maximizes the welfare of its citizens with no regard on the repercussions on its 
neighbour country. A numerical exercise is built to examine the sensitivity of the 
resulting non cooperative equilibrium to the aversión to inequality exhibited by the 
different governments as well as to the factor endowments of their respective 
countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decades, member countries of the E.U. have experienced increasing 
capital and to a lesser extent labor mobility. This along with the process of economic 
integration lead and still leads to a number of positive effects. However, it has also 
the effect of making increasingly difficult redistributive policies at the national level. 
The basic idea is that mobile factors can react to any intemational differentials in 
taxation or benefits. National governments cannot abstract from such potential 
reaction when designing redistributve policies. 
In this paper we concéntrate on the effect of intemational mobility of capital on the 
capacity of nations to redistribute income. To make the problem more realistic we 
allow for tax evasión, which is an issue of great concern for E.U countries. Our 
treatment of tax evasión is, however, rudimentary . We follow Boadway-Marchand-
Pestieau (1994) in using a cost of tax evasión (or income concealment), which 
depends on the amount of income evaded. It is assumed that once incurred, the tax 
evader is certain to escape detection by tax authorities. In other words, he does not 
face any uncertainty. Alternatively, our model could be interpreted as one of tax 
avoidance with compliance costs.1 
To cope with this issues, we consider in this paper a two-country model with mobile 
capital and immobile labor. Even though such a setting fits the European reality, it 
has not been extensively studied.2 In our model, we assume that each country 
consists of two classes: the workers and the capital owners. Two taxes on capital 
income are introduced to finance transfers towards the workers, assumed to be the 
poor.These taxes exhibit different evasión characteristics. The first one, following the 
origin principie, alters the return and intemational allocation of capital and cannot be 
evaded. The second one, following the residence principie, induces the evasión of 
capitalists' bicornes. 
We show that national governments acting without coordination will find it difficult 
to distribute resources from mobile capital to immobile labor. We construct a 
numerical experiment in order to examine the sensitivity of the resulting non 
cooperative equilibrium to the aversión to inequality exhibited by the different 
governments as well as to the factor endowments of their respective countries. Taking 
as the starting point the case of no evasión, then we examine two cases of decreasing 
difficult) for tax evasión. Their comparison proves that as tax evasión becomes 
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easier, redistribution worsens . When the evasión cost is lowered capitalists become 
richer, workers become poorer, and national income falls. The cost of evasión is 
wasteful loss of resources. As for the tax instruments, the residence-based taxes fall 
whereas the source-based taxes rise (from a negligible level). 
2. T H E MODEL 
Consider a world economy composed of two nations (indexed by i = A, B). In country 
/ there are N¡ workers each endowed with one unit of labor and Mi capitalists, each 
endowed with Ki¡M¡ units of capital. Both agents supply their endowments inelastic 
ally. We assume that labor is immobile whereas capital is mobile. Capital mobility 
allows capitalists to invest in any country so that if we denote by K¡ the capital 
invested in country i we will typically have K¡ * K¡. 
Production 
Both countries use the same constant returns to scale technology. In any country i 
capital and labor are used as inputs by an aggregate domestic perfectly competitive 
firm to obtain a nontraded commodity according to the production function 
This output may be seen as the Gross Domestic Product of country i. Normalizing the 
price of output to equal one, we have the familiar profit-maximization conditions: 
(2) / ' ( * , ) =r + T , and tffcWM**,* 
where w denotes the prevailing wage rate in country i and xi is a source-based 
capital tax. Notice that t¡ inserís a wedge between the cost of capital to domestic 
firms, r + T ¡ ( and the domestic return on capital, r. The latter is common to both 
countries due to the existence of an intemational capital market. Conditions (2) can 
be used to obtain the demand for capital and the factor-price frontien 
(3) Á((r + T ( ) and w . ( r + T , ) with w ] « - ^ ; 
to be employed below. 
Workers 
All individuáis are assumed to have the same well behaved utility function defined on 
income. lncomes are however different. For a worker. it is the sum of his wage 
income and a lump sum transfer. that is 
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(4) «iGÜ w i t h > 0. u "< 0 >'*. = w ¡ + • 
Capitalists 
For a capitalist, with utility function 
(5) v , (y j with v,() ««,.(•) 
his income is given by the sum of his domestic income plus his foreign income minus 
the cost of evasión in which he incurs, that is 
(6) ya = (r - ) • s,,+ r • (k¿ - s,) - a,(£,, - s¿) = rk,, - tfit - qfa - st}. 
Some extra notation has been introduced in (6). For any capitalist in country / we 
denote kt = Ki¡Mi: his capital endowment, s¡: his domestic investment, -s¡) 2:0: 
his capital invested abroad (totally evaded), r : per unit return on capital in the world 
economy, t¡: residence-based unitary capital tax levied in country i , ( /* - / , ) : per unit 
net return on capital in country f, ( r - r , ) ^ : his domestic income, r - ( ^ -s¡): his 
foreign income, and a,(k, - s,): his evasión cost. 
Our formulation of tax evasión is deliberately exploratory (rudimentary, if you wish). 
We assume, following Boadway-Marchand-Pestieau (1994), that any capitalist bears 
a cost of tax evasión which is increasing in the capital evaded and that, once incurred, 
he is certain to escape detection by tax authorities. In other words, no attempt is made 
to model the capitalist decisión of how much income to evade as a decisión under 
uncertainty with a probability of getting caught and a penalty for being caught. 
Contrary to workers, capitalists are not income takers. Any capitalist chooses the 
domestic investment that maximizes (6)3 . The FOC is as follows: 
and has a simple interpretation. The capitalist will evade up to the point where the net 
return on capital is the same in his domestic country as abroad. Or equivalently, until 
the point in which the unitary tax equals the marginal cost of tax evasión. 
As for the SOC : 
'O (5i*i ift) 
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it requires the cost of evasión,a,, to be an increasing (o'¡ > 0) and convex (o"> 0) 
function of the capital evaded, k¡ - s , (see Figure 1). We also impose a,(0) =0 to 
prevent any fixed cost of evasión. 
Remark: The optimality condition /, =cr'(£I -s¡) permits to derive an individual 
"supply of domestic capital" depending on the unitary tax (but not on the world return 
on capital): 
(9) 5, =5 l(r,) . 
assumed to be decreasing in /, to reflect the (popular) view that increasing evasión is a 
direct consequence of increasing marginal tax rates. 
For example, in the evasión cost function we use below, namely 
a , (Á,-5 , )=( l /c , ) (^-5 i ) r , y > l , 
condition /, =o[ entails 5,, = k¡ -{tffy)^' .., which is decreasing in li and c¡. 
Moreover y = 2 implies the linear supply function s, • -(l/2)t,c, (see Figure 2). 
Figure 1. Tiie cost of evasión as a 
funciion ofthe capital evaded. 
Figure!. Tlie domestic supply of capital 
as a function ofthe residence-based tax on 
capital. 
As for the parameter c,. it scales the cost of tax evasión. Ceteris paribus, the greater 
c the lower the cost of evasión and the more attractive this ilegal activity. 
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Government 
In any country í, the domestic govemment wishes to undertake some redistribution in 
favour of their workers, assumed to be poor in contrast with capitalists. To that effect, 
it levies a per-unit tax,T,, on the capital employed in the domestic country, K¡, and a 
per-unit tax t, on the domestic investment of its capitalists,. Tax revenues are then 
transferred to its is workers, via Nt lump-sum transfers T¡ so as to increase their 
incomes. The govemment budget constraint is therefore 
(10) ^ £ ( r + T j + l ^ f r ) ' - A W 
where Nfrir + T ¡ ) E £.(r + T , ) is the domestic demand for capital, and Mpft^ * 
5,(0 is the domestic "supply" of capital. The former is influenced by the source-
based capital tax and the latter by the residence-based capital tax. 
Welfare problem 
The govemment in country i chooses its optimal mix of capital taxes { T „ Í , | SO as to 
maximize a utilitarian social welfare function, given the source-based capital tax 
chosen by the other country -/ and the capital market clearing condition, that is 
( 1 L 1 ) w ' = N i ' u i [ w i ( r +
 T i ) + r i - k i ( r + t í ) + ^ - l m a ( 0 | + 
s.t. 
(11.2) Mfr + MjLt = /V,*,(r+ T . ) + N_,Jc_i{r+ r_,) ( P i ) 
Forming the Lagrangean, Awe obtain the first order conditions: 
(12.1) dAjdr = Nfr• {w¡ + T , A / ) + M,v& - p, -{Nfr + N_X,) = 0, 
(12.2) dAjdx, - A > ; . ( W ; + T ( * > kt)-ptNtk;-Ot 
(12.3) dAjdt, - u\ •(M,s, + í,Af,s;•)- v'tMt • i , - 0, 
w here use has been made of tt • o[ in (123). 
Using H , ' - - A , wc get from (12.2) p, « u , - T , . This together with w,'- - A , in (12.1) 
yields 
(13) Ü *!¿ V / - A . B . 
v A)A.* T..V.A:, 
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Finally,we can réstate (123) as follows 
(14) * 
v s, + t,S 
with ) ? j « - Í s - ^ . > 0 V/=A,£ 
FOC (12.1) and (12.2) (and consequently equation (13)) also arise in a world with 
no tax evasión. FOC (123) (and consequently equation (14)) concems tax evasión. 
With y, E(0,1) we have u\ > v¡ so that at the optimum the distribution of income is 
not egalitarian at the national level. The comparison of (13) and (14) implies: 
(15) 1 M 
ln the section below we construct a numerical experiment to gain some insight on 
these results. 
3. A NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT 
Assumptions: 
( A l ) A CRS Cobb-Douglas production function Z, = N°K*~a = N,k¡~a, k, * KJN¡ 
leading to the demand for capital A, = [(1 - a)/(r + T , - )]"" and the factor-price frontier 
w. = a[(l - a) /(r+ l)f~°**. The RHS of (13) becomes 
M,K Z ^ _ 
NA + rfrJY = N¡k¡ - a \ \ - a)'\{\ - a)k¡a -r)N_A*a 
(A2) A tax evasión cost function a,(A¿ -s¡) = (l/c^KA, -s¡)r, y > 1, which together 
with the equilibrium condition (7), tt =cr', lead to the domestic supply of capital 
s i ~ K - ( í ¡ c ¡ /y ) 1 ' ( r 1 • The latter expression permits to réstate o¡ = {^lci\tfily)rl(r . 
The incomes of capitalists and workers become, respectively: 
Yo -r% - tfy - o , - ( r - r $ + ((y - l)/c,)(í(c,/y ) * 
Y „ , = wt + t¡-A¿ + (mti/N,) = ( C -r)k, + ¡MM)(h -(cfyftr) 
(A3) Same preferences for workers and capitalists: u¡ - v, = yf', implying in view of 
(A2) 
_ I Ye. 
v'i \ Y H ( / 
( r - 0 5 + ( ( r - i ) / c , X W r ) * 
^ (kfr - r)A, + ( H / J V ^ f t - (c,/y ^ 
(A4) Using 5, = A, -(tfi/y)**'" we haveq, = - ( / /M) s / = 
so that the RHS of (14) becomes 
( y - l ^ - ( ^ / r r " 1 , 
Using (A l ) to (A4) conditions (11.2). (15) and (13) form a five-equation system in 
the five unknowns {kA.kB.r.tA.tg). namely: 
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(16.1) NAkA+NBkB = KA+KB, 
(16.2) 
AL 
( y - i ) JL 
NAkA-a-l(l-a)-\(l-a)k-Aa-r\NBkr 
( y - D 
'K ^ 
- y 
(16.3) A L 
( y - i ) 
A / . I y 
J V , * a - a - , ( l - a ) - ' [ ( l - a ) * r - ' - K * /4 
(16.4) 
4-1, I C4 
( y - i ) ( i . 
tV 
l y J / 
( y - D - y 
(16.5) 
J Y B 
t ' I . s 
M Bl 
y ; 
Ir 
\ y ) 
i-Pe 
(Y-i) [£B_ 
, y , 
Once this system is solved we compute for each country / a number of concepts, viz.: 
• the optimal source-based tax on capital: T , • (l - a)k~a -r, i = A,B 
• the capitalisfs income: ya = (r - tt\KjMl) + ((y - l)/c, 
• the capitalisfs domestic investment: sí = (KjM^ ^{ffii/f) 
• the worker's income: y M =(k;a - r)k, + {MJN, )(jc,t, - ( c . / y ) * / " ) 
• the national income: Y, = Ntym + M, vCl 
• the gross domestic product: Zt - Nf~° 
The above formulation is pretty general in the sense of depending on a vector of 
parameters We choose a - 3 / 4 to refiect a realistic common 
share of workers* income on national income of 75** in a latssez-faire equihbnum 
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The parameter # is assumed to take one out of three possible valúes {o,T,l} 
reflecting high, intermedíate and zero aversión to inequality, respectively. This 
parameter is allowed to change between countries. We have chosen y = 2 to make 
the cost of tax evasión linear in /,. We consider two valúes for c, c = l(resp. 100) 
reflects that tax evasión is difficult (resp. easy). The number of worker may be 
symmetric ( \NA ,NB) - {100,100}) or asymmetric ( { ^ . A ^ } - {50,150}). Similarly 
the number of capitalist may also be symmetric ({MA,MB} = {5,5}) or asymmetric 
{{Ma,Mb} = {2,8}). Capital endowments are always KA = KB — 100. 
Here below we give some selected examples. We take as the starting point the case of 
no tax evasión (Table 1). This case arises when no residence-based taxes are allowed , 
t{ = 0. Then we examine two cases where evasión is difficult, c = 1, (Table 2) and 
easy, c = 100, (Table 3). The comparison of the two latter cases accords to intuition: 
tax evasión typically worsens redistribution. When the evasión cost is reduced 
(c=100), capitalists become richer, workers become poorer, and national income falls. 
The cost of tax evasión represents a wasteful loss of resources. As for the tax 
instruments, the residence-based taxes fall whereas the source-based taxes rise (from 
a negligible level). 
Discussion 
We now comment on the six headings in which are divided Tables 1 to 3. 
1. Symmetric countries (cases 111,121,131). 
1.1 If taxation is constrained to be source-based (t¡ =0 Vz), no tax evasión 
arises and (13) becomes 
d3') v*««; 1 + k i £ - \ < u > tf x >o 
{ Kt dr ) 
In words, if previous to intervention (laissez-faire) in country i the income of workers 
was lower than the income of capitalists [yWi < y 0 ) , implying a higher marginal 
utility to workers uJ'Vv,', after intervention we must still expect u\ >v¡, implying 
again yVl < yC l , since public policy is less than fully redistributive. The comparison of 
cases (111), (121) and (131) of Table 1 shows how the income of workers become 
closer to the income of capitalists as governments become more averse to inequality. 
The case (131) correspond to GNP maximizalion for governments and coincides with 
the laissez-faire equilibrium. 
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Table I . NON C O O P E R A T I V E E Q U I L I B R I A (u=3/4) 
Gaw Pa Pn Ta Ti r ywA ycA ya» »A 0 ) B MS 
Symmetric countries: (NA, NB )= (100. 1 ()()), (MA, MB) - í 5 5 ) 
- l-'l Jl¡ 
(KA KB\ = (100. 100) 
( I I I ) 0 0 0.123 0.123 0.127 0.873 2.539 0.873 2.539 0.324 0.324 0.873 0.873 yes 
(121) 1/2 1/2 0.091 0.091 0.159 n RA i 3 179 0.841 3.179 0 349 0 349 0.841 0.841 
(131) 1 1 0 0 0.250 0.75) 5 0.75) 5 0.333 0.333 0.75) 0.75) ves? 
A symmetric preferences 
(211) 0 1 0.094 0.037 0.188 0.800 3.765 0.819 3.765 0.451 0.333 0.810 0.813 yes 
(21V) 1 0 0.037 0.094 0.188 0.819 3.765 o!»x) 3.765 0.333 0.451 0.813 0.810 je.* 
(221) 0 1/2 0.115 0.100 0.143 0.852 2.858 0.861 2.858 0352 0340 0^ 856 0^ 858 yes 
(131) 1/2 1 0.069 0.026 0.204 0.789 4.086 0.81X) 4.086 0.423 0.314 0.794 0.797 ves 
Asymmetric number of workers: (NA, NB) = (50, 150) 
(112 ) 0 0 0.063 0.166 0.121 0.925 2.423 0.855 2.423 0.446 0.183 0.792 0.914 yes 
(122) 1/2 1/2 0.035 0.136 0.150 0.881 3.(X)5 0.831 3.005 0.470 0.225 0.746 0.892 yes 
(132) 1 1 -0.045 0.051 0.232 0.760 4.650 0.762 4.65) 0.466 0.228 0.620 0.831 no 
Asymmetric number of capitalists: (MA, MB) = (2. 8) 
(113) 0 0 0.134 0.110 0.129 0.863 6.437 0.879 1.609 0.228 0.430 0.870 0.872 yes 
(113) 1/2 1/2 0.105 0.083 0.157 0.838 7.834 0.848 1.959 0.317 0393 0.842 0.844 yes 
(133) 1 1 0 0 0.250 0.750 12.500 0.750 3.125 0.333 0.333 0.750 0.750 yes? 
Asymmetric preferences and number of workers: (NA, NB) = (50. 150) 
(212) 0 1 0.051 0.101 0.164 0.851 3.276 0.829 3.276 0.576 0.199 0.722 0.884 yes 
(212') 1 0 -0.024 0.125 0.187 0.822 3.744 0.789 3.744 0.455 0.331 0.687 0.863 no 
(222 ) 0 1/2 0.060 0.147 0.132 0.903 2.649 0.849 2.649 0.468 0.195 0.773 0.906 jes 
(132) 1/2 1 0.025 0.087 0.183 0.830 3.653 0.810 3.653 0.550 0.195 0.694 0.869 yes 
Asymmetric preferences and number of capitalists: (MA. MB) = (2. 8) 
(213) 0 
(213') 1 
(213) 0 
(133) 1/2 
1 
0 
1/2 
I 
0.107 
0.032 
0.126 
0.086 
0.043 
0.082 
0.090 
0.034 
0.180 
0.196 
0.144 
0.193 
0.806 
0.810 
0.845 
0.797 
8.996 0.829 
9.802 0.795 
7.188 0.866 
9.670 0.813 
2.249 
2.45) 
1.797 
2.418 
0.464 
0.282 
0.314 
0.442 
0391 
0.438 
0.424 
0.357 
0.817 
0.805 
0.855 
0.805 
0.822 yes 
0.802 yes 
0.858 yes 
0.808 yes 
uhrrc T, - / /7 , /r fr , . to - A/,.vm/K, and MS slands for minimal standards. 
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Table I (cont.) NON C O O P E R A T I V E E Q U I L I B R I A (a = 3/4) 
Cas* * A w„ k A k„ K A K„ Y A Y„ Z A Z B A K A A K B 
Symmrtric countries: (NA, NB )= (¡00. ¡OO), (MA. MB) = (5. 5). (KA. KB) = (100, 100) 
( I I I ) 075 0.75 1 1 100 100 100 100 loo 100 0 0 
(121) 075 0.75 I 1 100 100 100 100 loo 100 0 0 
031) 0.75 0.75 1 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 
A s vmnettk preferences 
(211) 0720 0.776 0.851 1.149 85.106 114.894 98.852 10O728 96.048 103.532 14.894 -14.894 
(211) 0.776 0.720 1.149 0.851 114.894 85.106 100.728 98.852 103.532 96.048 -14.894 14.894 
(221) 0.742 0.758 0.958 1.042 95.828 104.172 99.536 100.431 98.940 101.027 4.172 -4.172 
(131) 0.728 0.770 0.886 1.114 88.634 111.366 99.351 100.406 97.029 102.728 11.366 -11.366 
Asymmetric number of workers: (NA, NB) = (50, 150) 
(112) 0.830 0.717 1.500 0.833 75 " 125 58.362 140.288 55.334 143.317 25 -25 
(122 ) 0829 0.717 1.492 0.836 74.586 125.414 59.076 139.616 55.258 143.435 25.414 -25.414 
(1.32 ) 0825 0.719 1.466 0.845 73.301 126.699 61.225 137.594 55.018 143.801 26.699 -26.699 
Asymmetric number of capitalists: (MA, MB) = (2, 8) 
(113 ) 0.737 0.762 0.934 1.066 93.448 106.552 99.164 100.756 98.320 101.599 6.552 -6.552 
(123 ) 0.739 0.761 0.943 1.057 94.252 105.748 99.432 100.506 98.531 101.407 5.748 -5.748 
(13.3 ) 0.750 0.750 1 1 100 100 100 1(X) 100 100 0 0 
Asymmetric preferences and number of workers: (NA. NB) = (50, 150) 
(212 ) 0.789 0.735 1.227 0.924 61.337 138.663 58.953 140.749 52.621 147.082 38.663 -38.663 
(212') 0865 0.696 1.769 0.744 88.458 111.542 59.826 137.132 67.665 139.293 11.542 -11.542 
(222) 0.819 0.722 1.419 0.860 70.927 129.073 58.418 140.619 54.567 144.47 29.073 -29.073 
(132 ) 0.798 0.732 1.284 0.905 64.198 135.802 59.764 139.777 53.224 146.317 35.802 -35.802 
Asymmetric preferences and number of capitalists: (MA. MB) -- (2, 8) 
(2M) 0717 0.779 0.834 1.166 83.375 116.625 98.548 100.929 95.556 103.92 16.625 -16.625 
(211 > O 774 0 724 1.132 0.868 113.213 86.787 100.561 99.109 103.151 96.519 -13.213 13.213 
(223» (»73| 0 767 0.905 1.095 90.452 109.548 98.895 100.933 97.522 102.306 9.548 -9.548 
(233( (1723 0775 0.862 1.138 86.213 113.787 99.026 100.615 96.359 103.282 13.787 -13.787 
h hcrr > - A',. i - A,B. 
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Table 2. NON C O O P E R A T I V E E Q U I L I B R I A WITH TAX EVASION ( a = 3/4, y = 2, c = 1) 
Vtnr p» Pn tA ta * k.\ kn xA T B S A S„ O A O b y W A y C A ywn yo» 
\\mmetru tonntries: (NA. NI) )= (100. 100). (MA. MB) = (5. 5). (KA. KB) ^  (100. 100) 
(llt> (i 0 0.202 0.202 0.249 1 1 0.001 0.001 19.900 19.900 0.010 0.010 0.952 0.957 0.952 0.957 
(121) U2 1/2 0.202 0.202 0.249 1 1 0.001 0.001 19.900 19.900 0.010 0.010 0.951 0.961 0.951 0.961 
(MI) 1 1 0 0 0.25) 1 1 0 0 20 20 0 0 0.75) 5 0.75) 5 
A «j mmetrit preferences 
(211) o i 0.202 0 0.25) 0.999 1.001 0.001 0 19.899 20 0.010 0 0.952 0.957 0.750 4.990 
(211) 1 0 0 0.202 0.25) l.(X)l 0.999 0 0.001 20 19.899 0 0.010 0.75) 4.990 0.952 0.957 
(221) 0 1/2 0.202 0.202 0.249 1 1 0.001 0.001 19.899 19.899 0.010 0.010 0.952 0.957 0.951 0.961 
(231) \n 1 0.202 0 0.25) 0.999 1.001 0.001 0 19.899 20 0.010 0 0.951 0.961 0.75) 4.991 
Asyimnftrit number oí workers: (NA. NB) = (50. 150) 
(112) O 0 0.176 0.188 0.232 1.466 0.845 -0.044 0.052 19.912 19.906 0.008 0.009 1.112 1.117 0.887 0.892 
(122) l'2 1/2 0.176 0.187 0.232 1.466 0.845 -0.044 0.052 19.912 19.906 0.008 0.009 1.111 1.121 0.887 0.896 
(132) 1 I 0 0 0.232 1.466 0.845 -0.045 0.051 20 20 0 0 0.760 4.650 0.762 4.650 
Asymmetric number ofcapilalists: (MA, MB) = (2, 8) 
(113) O O 0.230 0.175 0.249 1.001 0.998 0.001 0.001 49.885 12.412 0.013 0.008 0.980 0.982 0.925 0.931 
(123) |/2 1/2 0.230 0.175 0.249 1.001 0.999 0.001 0.001 49.885 12.413 0.013 0.008 0.980 0.985 0.924 0.938 
(1.33) | 1 0 0 0.250 1 1 0 0 50 12.500 0 0 0.750 12.500 0.750 3.125 
AsymmetrU preferences and number of workers: (NA, NB) = (50, 150) 
(212) O 1 0.177 0 0.232 1.464 0.845 -0.044 0.052 19.912 20 0.008 0 1.112 1.117 0.763 4.641 
(212) 1 O 0 0.188 0.232 1.468 0.844 -0.045 0.052 20 19.906 0 0.009 0.760 4.643 0.887 0.892 
(222) i) 1/2 0 176 0.187 0.232 1.466 0.845 -0.044 0.052 19.912 19.906 0.008 0.009 1.112 1.117 0.887 0.896 
(232i 12 1 1) 176 0 0.232 1.464 0.845 -0.044 0.052 19.912 20 0.008 0 1.111 1.121 0.763 4.641 
4 %jtnmrrri< J"fferrru es and number ofcapilalists: (MA, MB) - (2. 8) 
n i 0 230 0 0.250 0.999 1.001 0 0 49.885 12.500 0.013 0 0.980 0.982 0.750 3.122 
(213 ) 1 ii 1) O 175 0 249 l.(X)2 0.998 0 0.001 50 12.412 0 0.008 0.751 12.467 0.925 0.931 
( 223» 11 12 (>2V> O 175 0.249 1.001 0.999 0.001 0.001 49.886 12.413 0.013 0.008 0.980 0.982 0.924 0.938 
C 3 U i : 1 0 23O O 0.250 0.999 1.001 
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0 0 49.885 12.500 0.013 0 0.980 0.985 0.750 3.122 
Table 2 (cont.). NON C O O P E R A T I V E E Q U I L I B R I A WITH T A X EVASION ( « = 3/4, y = 2, c = I)) 
Case wA wn K A K„ A K A AK„ Y A Y B Z A Z B wA coB T ^ T í V B MS 
Symmetric countries: (NA. NB )= (KM, 100). (MA. MB) = (5. 5). (KA. KB) = (100. 100) 
( I I I ) HK) l(N) U 0 99.949 i on i no u.yjz no 
(121) 100 I(X) 0 0 99.949 99.949 100 100 0.952 0.952 -0.204 -0.204 no 
(131) 100 100 0 0 I(X) 100 100 100 0.730 0.75) 0.333 0.333 7 
A.i vthmetric preferences 
(211) 99.873 I(X). 127 0.127 -0.127 99.949 1(X) 99.968 100.032 0.952 0.75) 0.334 -0.437 no 
(21V) 100.127 99.873 -0.127 0.127 100 99.949 100.032 99.968 0.750 0.952 -0.437 0.334 no 
(221) 100 I(X) 0 0 99.949 99.949 100 100 0.952 0.952 -0.204 -0.435 no 
(131) 99.873 100.127 0.127 -0.127 99.949 100 99.968 100.032 0.952 0.75) 0.334 -0.206 no 
Asymmetric nmnber of workers: (NA, NB) = (50, 150) 
(112) 73.322 126.678 26.678 -26.678 61.164 137.57 55.022 143.795 0.909 0.968 -0.289 -0.487 no 
(122 ) 73.322 126.678 26.678 -26.678 61.164 137.57 55.022 143.795 0.908 0.967 -0.056 -0.261 no 
(132 ) 73.302 126.698 26.698 -26.698 61.225 137.594 55.018 143.801 0.620 0.831 0.466 0.227 7 
Asymmetric nmnber of capitalists: (MA, MB) = (2, 8) 
(113) 100.118 99.882 -0.118 0.118 99.974 99.939 100.03 99.970 0.980 0.925 -0.297 -0.682 no 
(113) 100.118 99.882 -0.118 0.118 99.974 99.939 1(X).029 99.971 0.980 0.925 -0.077 -0.487 no 
(1.33) 100 100 0 0 100 100 100 100 0.750 0.75) 0.333 0.333 ? 
Asymmetric preferences and nmnber of workers: (NA, NB) = (50. 150) 
(212) 73.206 126.794 26.794 -26.794 61.178 137.611 55 143.828 0.909 0.831 0.467 -0.489 no 
(212') 73.418 126.582 26.582 -26.582 61.211 137.553 55.040 143.768 0.621 0.968 -0.291 0.228 no 
(222) 73.322 126.678 26.678 -26.678 61.164 137.57 55.022 143.795 0.909 0.967 -0.056 -0.487 no 
(232) 73.206 126.794 26.794 -26.794 61.178 137.611 55 143.828 0.908 0.831 0.467 -0.262 no 
Asymmetric preferences and number of capitalists: (MA, MB) = (2,8) 
(213) 99.942 1(X).()58 0.058 -0.058 99.973 100 99.986 100.014 0.980 0.75) 0.334 -0.686 no 
(2IV) 100.176 99.824 -0.176 0.176 100 99.938 100.044 99.956 0.751 0.925 -0.298 0.335 no 
(213) 100.118 99.882 -0.118 0.118 99.974 99.939 100.029 99.971 0.980 0.925 -0.077 -0.682 no 
(233) 99.942 KX1.058 0.058 -0.058 99.974 100 99.986 100.014 0.980 0.750 0.334 -0.490 no 
«hete 7, -dlfdTr ni - N v w / T , and MS stands for mi ni mal standards. 
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Table 3. NON C O O P E R A T I V E E Q U I L I B R I A WITH TAX EVASION ( a = 3/4, y = 2, c = 100) 
Uair p, Pn tA tB r k A k B xA xB sA s„ o A o B y W A y C A ywn yai 
Snmnelru<oimtries: (NA. NB )= (100. 100). (MA. MB) = (5. 5). (KA. KB) = (100. 100) 
( I I I ) () O 0.115 0.115 0.174 I I 0.076 0.076 14.254 14.254 0.330 0.330 0.907 1.520 0.907 1.520 
(121) \1 1/2 0.100 0.100 0.187 I 1 0.063 0.063 14.997 14.997 0.2.50 0.250 0.888 1.998 0.888 1.998 
(131) I I 0 0 0.250 1 1 0 0 20 20 0 0 0.750 5 0.750 5 
Asytnmetric preferences 
C I D o 1 0.138 0 0.207 0.892 1.108 0.066 0.025 13.104 20 0.476 0 0.878 1.853 0.797 4.136 
C I D 1 0 0 0.138 0.207 1.108 0.892 0.025 0.066 20 13.104 0 0.476 0.797 4.136 0.878 1.853 
(221) o 1/2 0.120 0.096 0.180 0.979 1.021 0.073 0.066 14.015 15.187 0.358 0.232 0.902 1.574 0.894 1.916 
1231) l'2 1 0.114 -0 0.216 0.915 1.085 0.051 0.019 14.307 20 0.324 0 0.861 2.376 0.786 4.329 
Asyrmnetric nmnber of workers: (NA. NB) = (50, 150) 
D O 0 0 0.104 0.112 0.168 1.497 0.834 0.017 0.119 14.818 14.388 0.269 0.315 1.009 1.551 0.870 1.426 
1122) 1/2 1/2 0.091 0.097 0.179 1.491 0.836 0.007 0.107 15.462 15.132 0.206 0.237 0.979 1.962 0.856 1.861 
(132) 1 1 0 0 0.232 1.466 0.845 -0.045 0.051 20 20 0 0 0.760 4.650 0.762 4.650 
Asytmnetrit imml>er ofcapilalists: (MA, MB) = (2, 8) 
(113) O 0 0.180 0.077 0.189 1.043 0.957 0.053 0.070 40.979 8.661 0.814 0.147 0.962 1.233 0.862 1.548 
(123) 1/2 1/2 0.184 0.060 0.199 1.019 0.981 0.047 0.054 40.786 9.476 0.849 0.091 0.952 1.589 0.846 1.824 
(133) 1 1 0 0 0.250 1 1 0 0 50 12.500 0 0 0.750 12.500 0.750 3.125 
A \jmmetrii preferences and number of workers: (NA, NB) = (50, 150) 
(212) o I 0.121 0 0.191 1.310 0.897 0.014 0.081 13.933 20 0.368 0 0.989 1.752 0.802 3.811 
I2I2T I 0 0 0.137 0.201 1.681 0.773 -0.031 0.103 20 13.172 0 0.466 0.801 4.014 0.842 1.749 
C22) o 1/2 0.107 0.094 0.172 1.461 0.846 0.016 0.111 14.642 15.317 0.287 0.219 1.005 1.585 0.861 1.787 
(232) V2 I 0.102 0 0.199 1.339 0.887 0.002 0.074 14.918 20 0.258 0 0.960 2.209 0.794 3.985 
A gininetru preferences and number of capitalists: (MA, MB) = (2, 8) 
(213) •< 1 0.224 0 0.225 0.936 1.064 0.038 0.014 38.824 12.500 1.249 0 0.946 1.329 0.776 2.814 
CI3> 1 (l 0 0.085 0.208 1.105 0.895 0.024 0.064 50 8.275 0 0.179 0.795 10.397 0.842 1.722 
(223) o 1/2 0.191 0.060 0.198 1.016 0.984 0.049 0.055 40.428 9.490 0.916 0.091 0.957 1.254 0.847 1.816 
(233) 12 1 0 214 0 0.226 0.939 1.061 0.036 0.013 39.310 12.500 1.143 0 0.940 1.773 0.775 2.830 
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Table 3 (cont.) NON C O O P E R A T I V E E Q U I L I B R I A WITH TAX EVASION ( a = 3/4, y =2,c=IOO) 
Caw wA w„ K A K„ A K A AK„ Y A Y B Z A Z B o»A o)B T B V T A B MS 
Symmetric countries: (NA. NB )= (100. 100). (MA. MB) = (5. 5). (KA. Kli) = (100. 100) 
( I I I ) I(X) 100 ? ? 98.349 98.349 100 100 0.923 0.923 
(121) 100 100 ? ? 98.749 98.749 100 100 0.899 0.899 
(131) 100 100 ? ? 100 100 100 100 0.750 0.750 
A symmetric preferences 
(211) 89.208 110.792 10.792 -10.792 97.039 100.364 97.185 102.595 0.905 0.794 
(211 ) 110.792 89.208 -10.792 10.792 100.364 97.039 102.595 97.185 0.794 0.905 
(221) 97.923 102.077 2.077 -2.077 98.061 98.982 99.477 100.515 0.920 0.903 
(131) 91.479 108.521 8.521 -8.521 98.022 100.221 97.798 102.065 0.879 0.784 
Asymmetric nmnber of workers: (NA, NB) = (50. 150) 
(112 ) 74.873 125.127 25.127 -25.127 58.183 137.562 55.311 143.353 0.867 0.948 
(122 ) 74.566 125.434 25.434 -25.434 58.765 137.714 55.254 143.441 0.833 0.932 
(132 ) 73.301 126.699 26.699 -26.699 61.225 137.594 55.018 143.801 0.620 0.831 
Asytnmetric number of capitalists: (MA, MB) = (2, 8) 
(11.3) 104.330 95.670 -4.330 4.330 98.620 98.538 101.065 98.899 0.975 0.874 
(123) 101.881 98.119 -1.881 1.881 98.394 99.170 100.467 99.526 0.968 0.853 
(1.33) 100 100 0 0 100 100 100 100 0.750 0.750 
Asymmetric preferences and nmnber of workers: (NA, NB) = (50. 150) 
(212 ) 65.483 134.517 34.517 -34.517 58.225 139.392 53.488 145.97 0.850 0.863 
(212') 84.027 115.973 15.973 -15.973 60.135 135.119 56.929 140.656 0.666 0.935 
(222 ) 73.027 126.973 26.973 -26.973 58.172 138.141 54.967 143.879 0.864 0.935 
(232 ) 66.961 133.039 33.039 -33.039 59.078 138.985 53.788 145.567 0.813 0.857 
Asymmetric preferences and number of capitalists: (MA. MB) = (2.8) 
(213 ) 93.588 106.412 6.412 -6.412 97.303 100.122 98.357 101.566 0.973 0.775 
(2I31) 110.525 89.475 10.525 -10.525 100.345 98.018 102.533 97.258 0.793 0.859 
(223) 101.618 98.382 -1.618 1.618 98.249 99.189 100.402 99.593 0.974 0.854 
(233 ) 93.907 106.093 6.093 -6.093 97.535 1(X).I1 98.441 101.49 0.964 0.774 
where: 7'( -dTjdrj, in - / V ( y m / K , and MS stands for minimal standaitls. 
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1.2 If taxation is unconstrained and tax evasión is difficult (c=l), see Table 2, 
redistribution is very high in cases (111), {y^Ote} ={®-952, 0.957 } , and (121), 
{>Vi»3fc<} = {0-951, 0.961 } . As compared with t(131), intervention makes the share 
of workers income in national income, wi, to increase from a 75% in the L F E to a 
95.2% in cases (111) and (121). 
As evasión is difficult, investment is essentialy domestic, s¿ = 19.9, in cases (111) 
and (121). Compare with s, = 20 in the L F E . Taxes are essentially of the residence-
based type in contrast with the non evasión case. The optimal mix is 
{ / . . T , } - {202%, 0.1%} in cases (111) and (121). 
13 If taxation is unconstrained and tax evasión is easy (c=100), see Table 3, 
redistribution is not as high as in case of c = 1. The income pairs are now 
{>V,»Yc,} ={0.907, 1.520 } in case (111) and {yWi,yc,} - {0.888, 1.998} in case 
(121). Intervention increases the share a>i from a 75% in the L F E to a 923% in case 
(111) and to a 89.9% (121). Again the comparison of cases (111), (121) and (131) 
shows how the income of workers become closer to the income of capitalists as 
governments become more averse to inequality. 
As evasión is easy, domestic investment falls to s¡ = 14.254 (resp. 14.997) in case 
(111) (resp. (121)). As for taxes, residence-based looses weight in favour of source-
based. The optimal mix is {/¡,t,} = { l l . 5 % , 7.6%} in case (111) and {10%, 63%} 
in case (112). Finally, the cost of tax evasión means a loss of resources which 
translates in a national income that falls short the GDP , F, < Z¡. In case (111), 
Z, - Y, = 1.651 s5x0.330 = Mioi. 
2. Asymmetric preferences (cases 211, 211', 221 and 231). 
2.1 If taxation is constrained to be source-based (í, = 0 Vi) , then the country with 
the higher aversión to inequality establishes the higher tax rate: /S, < /S_, => r¡ > T_, . 
Let us consider, without loss of generality, the case (211) of Table 1, where 
{0.1}- Taxes are { T „ . T , } = {9.4%. 3.7%} and personal incomes 
{ . V M - Y o i } - { a 8 0 0 < 3 - 7 6 5 } versus {v H l .y„} - {&819, 3.765}. Workers' i ncomes 
shares become {íu„,íüe} - {81%, 81.3%}. 
2.2 If taxation is unconstrained and tax evasión is difficult (c=l), then the country 
with the higher aversión to inequality establishes the higher tax vecton/3 < /5 =» 
I " 
Consider again (211), but now of Table 2. Taxes are {tA, T a } = {20.2%, 0.1%} and 
{ Í B , T b } = {0%, 0%} . Personal incomes become {y H . A , y C A } = {0.952, 0.957} versus 
{ > W Y C B } = {0.750, 4.990}. Workers' incomes shares become {o)A,o)B} = 
{95.2%, 75%}. This is precisely what we had before when comparing cases (111) 
and (131). 
23 If taxation is unconstrained and tax evasión is easy (c=100), then the country with 
the higher aversión to inequality establishes the higher tax vector:/5, < /5_. =t> {t, , T , } 
Consider again (211), now of Table 3. Taxes are 
{ ' A ' T A } = {13.8%, 6.6%} and 
{ r s , r B } = {0%, 2.5%}. Personal incomes become { y H A , Y C A } • {0.878, 1.853} versus 
{.Vra,Ycfl} " {0.797, 4.136}. Workers' incomes shares become {OJA,(OB} = 
{90.5%, 79.4%}. 
The comparison of 2.2 and 23 reveáis that decreasing difficulty for tax evasión (c f ) 
worsens redistribution in A and improves that of B. 
3. Asymmetric number of workers (cases 112,122,132). 
3.1 If taxation is constrained to be source-based (t¡ = 0 Vz), then the country with the 
lower number of workers establishes the lower tax rate: NA < NB => T A < X B . 
Consider case (112), in Table 1, with fiA =PB = 0 and {NA,NB} = {50, 150}. Taxes 
are { T A , T b } = {63%, 16.6%} and personal incomes { y n , A , y C A } = {0.925, 2.423} 
versus {y,ig,yCB} = {0.855, 2423}. In the less populated country A the income of 
workers become closer to the income of capitalists. This is compatible with workers' 
incomes shares being {wA , tuB} = {79.2%, 91.4%} as here the number of 
individuáis count. 
3.2 If taxation is unconstrained and tax evasión is difficult (c=l), then the country 
with the lower number of workers establishes the lower tax vector: 
NA<NB => {tA.rA}x{tB.TB}. 
Consider again (112), now in Table 2. Taxes are { t A . r A } = {17.6%, -4.4%} and 
{ r S , T B } = { lR8%, 5.2%} because investment is essentially domestic meaning a high 
base for residence-based taxes. Redistribution improves that of 3.1 and is almost 
perfect: personal incomes become {.V»4»>c*}"{U 12. 1.117} and 
>'«»•.ve»} " {Q-887. 0.892}. Again this is compatible with workers' incomes share* 
being {wA,wt } - {90.9%. 96.8%} as the number of w orkers count 
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33 If taxation is unconstrained and tax evasión is easy (c=100), then the country with 
the lower number of workers establishes again the lower tax vector: 
NA<N„ => {tA,TA}s¡{tB,xB}. 
Consider again (112), now in Table 3. Taxes are {tA,rA} = {10.4%, 1.7%} and 
{ r B , r B } = { l l . 2%, 11.9%} as investment is not essentially domestic. Source-based 
taxes play a greater role than in 3.2. Redistribution is not as good as in 3.2 but 
improves that of 3.1. In effect, personal incomes become {>VA ,yCA} = {L009, 1.551} 
and { v H B , y C B } = {0.870, 1.426} 
4. Asymmetric number of capitalists (cases 113,123,133). 
4.1 If taxation is constrained to be source-based (/, = 0 V/) , then the country with the 
lower number of capitalists establishes the higher tax rate: MA < M B =s> rA > T B . 
Consider (113) in Table 1 (case 133 being the L F E ) , with /3A =/5B = 0 and 
{MA,MB} = {2, 8 } . Taxes are { T A , T b } = {13.4%, 11%} and personal incomes 
{y„A,yCA} = {0.863, 6.437} and {y„B,yCB} = {0.879, 1.609}. Country A has a lower 
endowment of capital and although it makes a higher fiscal effort than B cannot 
obtain the personal distribution of the latter. This is compatible with workers' 
incomes shares being {(ÜA,(OB}= {87%, 87.2%} as the number of capitalists count. 
4.2 If taxation is unconstrained and tax evasión is difficult (c=l), then the country 
with the lower number of capitalists establishes the higher tax vector MA < MB => 
Consider (113) in Table 2. Taxes become {tA,TA}= {23%, 0.1%} and {tB,rB} = 
{17.5%, 0.1%} because investment is essentially domestic meaning a high base for 
residence-based taxes. Redistribution improves that of 4.1 and is almost perfect: 
{ . V H A ' Y C A H I 0 - 9 8 0 ' 0-982} and {>vB ,yCB} = {0.925, 0.931}. Workers' incomes 
shares being {tüA,coB} = {98%, 92.5%} point in the same direction. 
43 If taxation is unconstrained and tax evasión is easy (c=100), then the country w ith 
the lower number of capitalists establishes the higher residence-based tax and the 
lower source-based tax: MA < M B =» tA>tB and xA < rB. 
Consider (113) in Table 3. Taxes become {tA.rA}- {l8%. 53%} and { / , . T , } -
{7.7%, 7%} while incomes turn to be {>•„„.yfA} - {Q962. 1.233} and {>•«,. Y c # } = 
{0.862. 1348}. Redistribution is better than in 4.1 and w orse than in 4.2. Workers 
incomes shares {wA.a)t) - {97.5%. 87.4%} point in the same direction. 
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5. Asymmetric preferences and number of workers (cases 212, 212', 222, 232). 
5.1 If taxation is constrained to be source-based (r, =0 Vi) , then we know from 2.1 
that the country with the higher aversión to inequality establishes the higher tax rate 
( A < 0 _ ¡ =*• T , > T _ ¡ ) and from 3.1 that the country with the lower number of 
workers establishes the lower tax rate (N¡ < N_, ^ xt < T _ , ) . 
In cases (212, 222 and 232) of Table 1 we have PA <PB pointing to xA > xB and 
NA < NB pointing torA < xB. Which effect dominates? In all three cases xA < xB, 
indicating that the " number of workers" effect dominates the "aversión to 
inequality" effect 
Focusing on case (212), taxes are { T A , T b } = {5.1%, 10.1%} and personal incomes 
{y„,A,.VC/l} = {a851, 3.276} and {ym,yCB} = {0.829, 3.276}. In the less populated 
country A the income of workers becomes closer to the income of capitalists. This is 
compatible with workers' incomes shares being {cüA,ít>B} = {72.2%, 88.4%} as 
here the number of individuáis count. 
5.2 If taxation is unconstrained and tax evasión is difficult (c=l), we know from 2.2 
that fiA<PB => {tA,xA} a {tB,xB} and from 3.2 that NA < NB =* {tA,xA} 
s { t 8 , T B } . The examination of cases (212, 222 and 232) of Table 2 reveáis xA < xB 
but does not provide an ambiguous sign to tA - tB. 
Concentrating on case (212), taxes become { r A , T A } = {17.7%,-4.4%} and 
{tB,rB}= {0%, 5.2%} because investment is essentially domestic meaning a high 
base for residence-based taxes in country A. Redistribution improves (resp. worsens) 
that of 5.1 in country A (resp. B) : {yWA,yCA} = {L112, 1.117} and {y^,yCB} 
= {0.763, 4.641}. Workers' incomes shares being {a>A,(oB} = {90.9%, 83.1%} 
point in the same direction. 
5.3 If taxation is unconstrained and tax evasión is easy (c=100), we know from 2.2 
that PA <PB => {tA,xA} s {tB,xB} and from 3.2 that NA<S'B =*> {tA,xA} 
s { r B , r B } . The examination of cases (212, 222 and 232) of Table 3 reveáis tA > tB and 
T A < xB. In words, the "aversión to inequality" effect dominates the residence-based 
taxes while the "number of workers effect" dominates the source-based taxes. 
Taking again case (212). taxes become \tA.rA} - {12.1%. 1.4%} and { / B . T B } « 
{0%, &1%}. As for incomes. they are{v H A .y ( A } - {(1989. 1.752} and ( v H B . y r B } = 
{0.802. 3.811}. For country A. redistribution is better than in 5.1 and worse than in 
5.2. For countn, B. the opposite occurs. Workers' incomes shares {tz>4.cuB} • 
{85%. 86.3%} do not convey the same idea. 
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6. Asymmetric preferences and number ofcapitalists (cases 213, 213', 223, 233). 
6.1 If taxation is constrained to be source-based (í, =0 V/) , then we know from 2.1 
that the country with the higher aversión to inequality establishes the higher tax rate 
(PA <PB = > T A > T b ) and from 4.1 that the country with the lower number of 
capitalists establishes the higher tax rate: MA < MB T A > T b . Both the "aversión 
to inequality" effect and " number of capitalists" effect point in the same direction. 
Cases (213, 223 and 233) of Table 1 confirm this fact. Focusing on case (213), taxes 
are {rA,xB} = {10.7%, 4.3%} while personal incomes { y ^ . y ^ } = {0.806, 8.996} 
and {>VB,yCB} = {Q829, 2.249}. The income of workers becomes closer to the 
income of capitalists in the richer country B, in spite of the higher fiscal effort of 
country A. Workers' incomes shares {wA,ít)B} = {81,7%, 82.2%} point in the same 
direction. 
6.2 If taxation is unconstrained and tax evasión is difficult (c=l), then we know from 
2.2 that/5A</5B =f {tA,TA} n { Í B , T b } and from 4.2 that MA < MB => {tA,xA} 
a { / B , T b } . Accordingly one should expect both effects to go in the same direction. 
Cases (213, 223 and 233) of Table 2 confirm this fact. Concentrating on case (213), 
taxes become { / A , T a } = {23%, 0%} and { t B , T B } = {0%, 0%}. The difficulty of tax 
evasión makes investment essentialy domestic in country A, thus provinding an 
important tax base for residence-based taxes. As for incomes, they are{yB,A,yCA} 
= {0.980, 0.982} and {yWB,yCB}= {0.750, 3.122}. Workers' incomes shares 
{OJA,Ü)B}= {98%, 75%} point in the same direction. 
6.3 If taxation is unconstrained and tax evasión is easy (c=100), then we know from 
2.3 that PA<PB => { t , 4 , T A } & { í B , T b } and from 4.3 MA<MB => t A > í B 
andrA < xB. 
Cases (213 , 223 and 233) of Table 3 reveáis tA >tB but no anambiguos sign for 
T A - T b . Concentrating on case (213), taxes are { / A , T a } = {22.4%, 3.8%} and 
{ t B , T B } = {0, 1.4%} while incomes become {FUA, \¿A} = {0.946, 1329} and 
{>'HB>YCI»} = {0-776, 2.814}. The same idea is conveyed by the workers' incomes 
shares {CÜA,O)B} = {973%, 77.5%}. 
The ranking of redistributions is 6.2v6.3v6.1 in country A . and 6.1 >- 63 >- 6.2 in 
country B. 
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have explored the consequences of capital mobility and tax evasión 
for the redistributive policies of a country acting under fiscal competition. 
A number of future extensions deserve to be explored, namely: tax determination 
through a majority voting scheme in the line of Gabszewicz and van Ypersele(1994), 
endogenous labour supplies to deal with unemployment, endogenous savings 
supplies to make savings mobile while keeping invested capital immobile. 
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